Spencer v. Nelson by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
5-27-1947
Spencer v. Nelson
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Spencer v. Nelson 30 Cal.2d 162 (1947).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/238
) 
/ 
7~61-C 
[So F. No. 17439. In Bank. May 27, 1947.] 
GLENN H. SPENCER, Appellant, V. TED NELSON et aI .• 
Respondents. 
[1] Appeal-Right of Review-Persons Entitled. - A party who 
is granted a new trial on only one of several issues has a right 
to appeal from the order where he is aggrieved by the limi-
tation of the new trial to a single issue which, he asserts, is 
not severable from the other issues. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 938, 
965.) 
[2] Id.-Judgments and Orders Appealable - Effect of Grant of 
New Trial.-When an appeal is taken from an order granting 
a new trial, the judgment remains effective for the purpose 
of an appeal from the judgment. 
[3] Id.-Dismissal-Judgment Appealed From.-An appeal from 
a judgment against the plaintiff will be dismissed where he 
has also appealed from the order granting a limited new 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 215; 2 Am.Jur. 943. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 90; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 33; [3] Appeal and Error, § 915. 
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trial and seeks an order in general form, and where the de-
cision on appeal, whether for appellant or respondent, will 
BUStain the order in one form or another and vacate the judg-
e ,ment. 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
County from an order granting a new trial. Leon 
Judge. Appeal from judgment dismissed; motion 
4i,eIJD.iJBS appeal from order denied. 
R. Agee and Harold C. Holmes, Jr., for Appellant. 
:H. Muldary and Norman Elkington for Respondents. 
YNOR, J.-Defendants and respondents have filed 
to dismiss two appeals, both taken by plaintiff and 
from an order granting a new trial and from 
was brought for declaratory relief to ascertain 
and effect of a written agreement. After trial 
court, judgment was entered in favor of defendants, 
!!'!-'-AJ ... = .... e. that the instrument was invalid. Plaintiff sought 
this adverse judgment both by motion for new 
by appeal, &.<! hereinafter appears. 
''PI''' ... ,tHF'" motion for new trial was in the usual form, 
of the grounds set forth was that the trial court 
to make a finding on the material issue of ratification. 
court's ruling was that "plaintiff's motion for a 
be and the same is hereby granted on the issue 
~tllDc:a.tliOn." Eight days later, on stipulation of counsel, 
the order but added the words "that the judg-
entered is vacated." 
first appeal is from the order granting a new 
It was taken on the theory that the issues of the 
not severable, that he was seriously prejudiced by 
liIItits.tio,n of the new trial to the single issue of rati-
and that the only proper order would be one grant-
trial on all of the issues. Thus, his sole grievance, 
primary reason for this appeal, is the limited form 
court's order; and, by the appeal, he asserts that 
, court abused its discretion in making the limited 
and seeks a reyersal thereof with directions to grant 
unlimited new trial. 
164 SPENCER t1. NELSON [30 C.2d 
Plaintiff's appeal from the judgment is subsidiary and 
purely precautionary. It was filed to take care of the situa-
tion that might arise (1) if the court's order were beld to 
be in substance a denial of a new trial rather than a grant-
ing thereof (in which case it would be nonappealable); 
or (2) if it were held that the plaintiff was not aggrieved 
by the granting of his own motion for a new trial. A serio 
ous problem of timeliness is raised in connection with the 
appeal from tl!.e judgment, but it is irrelevant in view of 
the holding we now make as to the propriety of the appeal 
from the order granting a new trial. 
[1] The basic contention of appellant is that he cannot 
have genuine relief from the adverse judgment by a new 
trial limited to a single issue, which, he asserts, is not sever. 
able from other issues; and that, in view of the pleadings 
and evidence, it can be shown that the trial court abused its 
discretion in making the order in the form it did. Thus ap. 
pellant has established the two conditions for his appeal: 
(1) the order granting a new trial is appealable (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 963); and (2) appellant was aggrieved by the order. 
The circumstance that this case is unusual in its facts, in 
that normally the party against whom the new trial is granted 
is the one who appeals, is immaterial; any party aggrieved 
by an appealable order has a right to appeal therefrom, even 
though the order is in form apparently favorable to him. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 938; Mountain Tunnel G. M. Co. v. 
Bryan, 111 Cal. 36 [43 P. 410]; Quint v. McMullen, 103 
Cal. 381, 383 [37 P. 381].) 
[2] As to the appeal from the judgment: One effect of 
an order granting a new trial is, of course, to vacate the 
judgment; however, when an appeal is taken from such an 
order the vacating effect is suspended, and the judgment 
remains effective for the purpose of an appeal from the judg. 
ment. (Jackson v. Dolan, 202 Cal. 468 [261 P. 7061; Puck-
haber v. Henry, 147 Cal. 424 [81 P. 1105].) [3] In the 
normal situation, the appeal from the order granting a new 
trial is filed by the party successful at the trial. and a cross-
appeal from the judgment is filed by the party unsuccessful at 
the trial to protect himself in the event that the order grant-
ing him a new trial is reversed. (See Rules on Appeal, rule 
3(a) (2).) Here the situation is different, for plaintitI has 
filed both the appeals, and defendants, the successful parties 
at the trial, are satisfied with the order granting the limited 
new trial and not onl¥ have not appealed therefrom but are 
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seeking to dismiss plaintifr'8 appeal therefrom. In 
IIUlUl".Ull, with neither party opposing the granting of 
trial, one seeking it in general form, the other in 
form, it is plain that the decision on this appeal 
· to sustain the order granting a new trial in one form 
This being so. the judgment will inevitably be 
the ordinary provisional effect of such vaea-
from the order grl1nting new trial may 
The appeal frcm such vacated judgment 
the,refore be properly dismissed. 
· motion to dismiss the appeal from the order grant-
new trial is denied, and the motion to dismiss the 
· from the judgment is granted. 
C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
Spence, J., concurred. 

